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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1536 
____________          
                                       
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KELVIN GANDY, 
   Appellant 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:08-CR-00186-004) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before:    McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: January 14, 2013) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Kelvin Gandy was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Gandy appeals, arguing 
that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he participated in a 
single cocaine distribution conspiracy as charged in the indictment.  Specifically, Gandy 
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argues that the evidence proved multiple conspiracies, rather than the single conspiracy 
charged, and also that he was merely a buyer, not a participant, in the conspiracy.  We 
reject both arguments and will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
I. 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
Following a lengthy under-cover investigation by the Pennsylvania State Police 
involving electronic and physical surveillance, informants, and execution of search 
warrants, Gandy and co-conspirators Burnie Majeed, Troy Cauthorn, and Jamille 
Barksdale were indicted in a seven-count indictment charging, inter alia, that the 
defendants conspired to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Majeed, Cauthorn, and Barksdale 
entered guilty pleas; Gandy proceeded to trial.  Majeed and Cauthorn testified for the 
Government at Gandy’s trial.  
Majeed and Cauthorn were the leaders of, and partners in, a drug-trafficking 
operation, the purpose of which was to distribute wholesale amounts of cocaine in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania.  Majeed and Cauthorn became partners in 2005.  The men 
shared common suppliers and engaged in substantial sales of wholesale quantities of 
cocaine to customers and distributors, including Gandy.  
Gandy first began purchasing cocaine from Majeed in the 1990s and continued to 
do so through 2006.  Gandy was designated as one of Majeed’s distributors and 
eventually became part of the “inner circle” of the Majeed-Cauthorn organization. (S.A. 
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175-76.)  The three men regularly discussed prevailing prices for cocaine, security 
measures to evade police detection, and individuals who stole money or drugs from other 
dealers in the organization.  At trial, Cauthorn explained that Gandy was included in 
these conversations because “he basically was with us, so he had to be aware of the 
situation just as well as me . . . .”  (S.A. 171.)  The men communicated in code or through 
gestures and regularly replaced their cellular phones and phone numbers in order to evade 
detection.  Gandy also accompanied Majeed on drug sales on at least two occasions. 
Majeed was Gandy’s primary supplier, selling Gandy four and one-half or nine-
ounce parcels of cocaine, two to three times per month.  Majeed sold cocaine on credit to 
trusted customers with whom he had an established relationship, including Gandy.  
Pursuant to this arrangement, Majeed provided Gandy with cocaine, and Gandy repaid 
Majeed as he earned money from his own sales.  Cauthorn testified that he observed 
Majeed and Gandy conduct $10,000 cocaine transactions on five to ten occasions.  
When Majeed’s supply of cocaine was low, Cauthorn provided Gandy the desired 
amount of cocaine.  From 2005 to 2006, Cauthorn sold Gandy between nine ounces and 
half a kilogram of cocaine on approximately five occasions.  On one occasion, Cauthorn 
supplied Gandy a kilogram of cocaine.  At least one of these transactions was conducted 
without Majeed’s knowledge.  Like Majeed, Cauthorn sold to Gandy on credit.  
Gandy also facilitated cocaine purchases and sales by Barksdale, another 
distributor to whom Majeed regularly sold two or three kilograms of cocaine per month 
and who often served as a conduit between Majeed and other dealers.  For example, in 
January 2006, while Barksdale was recovering from a gunshot wound at a Pennsylvania 
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hospital, Gandy delivered cocaine on Barksdale’s behalf to another dealer.  On another 
occasion, Gandy drove Barksdale to a sale and loaned him money to purchase cocaine.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
A. 
 Count One of the indictment charged: 
From at least in or about January 2005, through in or about 
December 2006, in Philadelphia and the city of Chester, in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and  elsewhere, 
defendants BURNIE MAJEED, TROY CAUTHORN, 
JAMILLE BARKSDALE, and KELVIN GANDY conspired 
and agreed, together with Edward Kaplan and Donald 
Johnson, charged elsewhere, and with others known and 
unknown to the grand jury, to knowingly and intentionally 
distribute 5 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance 
containing a detectable amount of  cocaine, a Schedule II 
controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States 
Code, Section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).  
 
(S.A. 384.)  
 Gandy first argues that the evidence adduced at trial proved multiple conspiracies, 
rather than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.  Specifically, Gandy claims 
that the evidence failed to show the existence of a single group whose purpose guided the 
actions of all participants.  Rather, argues Gandy, the evidence proved the existence of 
only limited partnerships and, as to Majeed and Gandy specifically, a buyer-seller 
relationship insufficient to support a finding of a single conspiracy.   
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 “To make out a conspiracy charge, the Government must show: (1) a unity of 
purpose between the alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and 
(3) an agreement to work together toward that goal.”  United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 
144, 147 (3d Cir. 2001).  At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that whether there 
existed a single or multiple conspiracies “is a question of fact for you to decide.”  (S.A. 
469.)  The District Court further charged that “[i]f the Government’s proof does not 
establish that [Gandy] was a member of [the] conspiracy [charged], then you may not 
find him guilty even if, for example, the evidence showed he was a member of a different 
conspiracy.”  (S.A. 469.)  The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government 
proved the single conspiracy charged and that Gandy was a participant in it.  
 “We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a 
jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence, [as] ‘[i]t is not for us to weigh the 
evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses.’”  United States v. Dent, 149 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d 
Cir. 1996)).  We must affirm a jury’s verdict where “there is substantial evidence that, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier 
of fact to convict.”1
                                              
 1 It is unclear whether Gandy’s sufficiency of the evidence argument has been 
preserved for appellate review.  “A defendant must move for a judgment of acquittal at 
the conclusion of the evidence to properly preserve for appeal issues regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence.”  United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Where a defendant fails to do so, we review the sufficiency of the evidence under a plain 
error, rather than substantial evidence, standard.  See id.  
  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
 The parties’ appendices contain only excerpts from the sealed trial transcript and 
do not reflect those portions of the trial during which a motion for judgment of acquittal 
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United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2009)).  An appellant alleging 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict carries a “very heavy burden.”  See United 
States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 Gandy fails to satisfy his “very heavy burden.”  Id.  First, Gandy fails to 
demonstrate that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that a single 
conspiracy existed.   
 We use a three-step test to determine whether a single conspiracy, rather than 
multiple conspiracies, existed: 
First, we examine whether there was a common goal among 
the conspirators.  Second, we look at the nature of the scheme 
to determine whether the agreement contemplated bringing to 
pass a continuous result that will not continue without the 
continuous cooperation of the conspirators.  Third, we 
examine the extent to which the participants overlap in the 
various dealings. 
 
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. 
DeVarona, 872 F.2d 114, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1989)).   
 In determining whether defendants had a common goal, “we look to the 
underlying purpose of the alleged criminal activity.”  United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 
194, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 
2007); Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259).  The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Gandy, 
                                                                                                                                                  
would have been made, if at all.  Neither party addresses the issue of preservation in its 
brief.  However, as discussed below, Gandy’s claim fails even under the more stringent 
“substantial evidence” standard, and thus his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
would similarly fail under the less demanding plain error standard.  See United States v. 
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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Majeed, Cauthorn, and Barksdale continuously bought and sold cocaine, regularly coded 
drug-trafficking conversations and took other steps to evade police detection, and 
discussed their joint cocaine-trafficking business on a recurring basis throughout the 
charged period.  Thus, a jury could rationally conclude that the accused co-conspirators 
shared the common goal of distributing five kilograms or more of cocaine.  
  Second, “‘[a]s to whether the ‘nature of the scheme’ indicates a single conspiracy, 
we look to whether there was evidence that the activities of one group . . . were necessary 
or advantageous to another aspect of the scheme or to the overall success of the 
venture.’”  Greenidge, 495 F.3d at 93 (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, “the agreement contemplated”—uninterrupted distribution of 
wholesale quantities of cocaine in Philadelphia and Chester throughout 2005 and 2006—
“would not [have] continue[d] without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators.”  
Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259.  The evidence showed that Majeed and Cauthorn partnered in 
2005 to ensure that each had an adequate supply of cocaine for distribution, regularly 
purchasing large quantities from at least two common suppliers.  The men further assisted 
one another by providing cocaine when one was short and the other had an adequate or 
surplus supply.  The evidence further established that Gandy served as a distributor, 
selling cocaine that he regularly received on credit from Majeed, and occasionally from 
Cauthorn when Majeed’s supply was short.  Gandy also facilitated cocaine sales for 
fellow distributor Barksdale.  Furthermore, Gandy, Majeed, and Cauthorn regularly 
discussed issues critical to the successful distribution of cocaine, such as prevailing prices 
and “counter-surveillance” issues and techniques.  (S.A. 84.)  Without the cooperation of 
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Majeed, Cauthorn, and distributors, such as Gandy, the Majeed-Cauthorn organization 
could not have succeeded.  
 Finally, there was extensive overlap in the conspirators’ dealings.  Majeed and 
Cauthorn shared a common supplier and provided each other with cocaine when one 
could not obtain the requisite amount from his usual supplier.  Both men sold cocaine on 
credit to distributors, including Gandy and Barksdale.  On several occasions, Gandy 
delivered cocaine and arranged sales for Barksdale.  Gandy, Majeed, and Cauthorn 
regularly discussed pricing and security concerns, communicating in code or gestures 
understood only by the others.  As Cauthorn explained, the men were part of an “inner 
circle” from which “no information [left] . . . .”  (S.A. 175.) 
 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude 
that it was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that a single overarching 
conspiracy existed.  In this regard, as we observed in United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 
196, 200 (3d Cir. 1986), even “a finding of a master conspiracy with sub-schemes does 
not constitute a finding of multiple, unrelated conspiracies . . . .”  
B.  
 Gandy also argues that even if the evidence supported a finding that there existed a 
single conspiracy, the evidence was not sufficient to show that he was a knowing 
participant in it.  Gandy argues that he was a “small customer” who did not distribute 
cocaine on Majeed’s behalf and thus he is not liable as a conspirator.   
 It is true that “a simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or 
contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to 
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establish that the buyer was a member of the seller's conspiracy.”  United States v. Gibbs, 
190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  But we went on to note in Gibbs that “‘even an 
occasional supplier (and by implication an occasional buyer for redistribution) can be 
shown to be a member of the conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge 
that she or he was part of a larger operation.’”  Id. at 198 (quoting United States v. Price, 
13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Factors relevant to the determination of whether a 
defendant was a member of a conspiracy include: “the length of affiliation between the 
defendant and the conspiracy,” the existence of “an established method of payment,” “the 
extent to which transactions are standardized,” “whether there is a demonstrated level of 
mutual trust,” and whether the “transactions involved large amounts of drugs.”  Id. at 
199.  
 Evidence of much more than a “simple buyer-seller relationship” was presented 
here.  Multiple individuals, including Majeed and Cauthorn,2
                                              
 2 Emphasizing that Majeed and Cauthorn were known drug dealers who testified 
in exchange for favorable dispositions in their own criminal cases, Gandy asserts that 
their testimony cannot support the jury’s verdict.  However, “in a review following 
conviction, all issues of credibility within the province of the jury must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the government.”  Gonzalez, 918 F.2d at 1132.  Thus, we must 
view the testimony of Majeed and Cauthorn in the light most favorable to the government 
and treat such testimony as credible. 
 testified that two to three 
times per month during the charged period, Gandy purchased from Majeed four and one-
half or nine-ounce parcels of cocaine.  When Majeed could not supply the requisite 
cocaine, Gandy obtained it from Cauthorn.  On one occasion, Gandy purchased from 
Cauthorn a kilogram of cocaine.  Additionally, Gandy made pre-arranged purchases for 
fellow distributor Barksdale, to whom he also lent money to finance drug purchases.  
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Gandy obtained the cocaine on credit, a payment arrangement that this Court has found to 
be relevant in establishing participation in a conspiracy because it may reflect mutual 
trust and “mutual stake” in the alleged conspiracy.  See Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199. 
 Although Gandy attempts to differentiate his involvement from that of fellow 
distributor Barksdale on the ground that Barksdale relayed messages to dealers on 
Majeed’s behalf and sold greater quantities of cocaine, Gandy admits that he 
accompanied Majeed on drug deals on at least two occasions.  Furthermore, Gandy’s 
regular purchases of significant quantities of cocaine from Majeed and Cauthorn 
demonstrate that he was more than a mere buyer “without any prior or contemporaneous 
understanding beyond the sales agreement itself.”  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197.   
 Additional evidence of the “length of affiliation” between Gandy and the 
conspiracy and “demonstrated level of mutual trust” among the conspirators was 
presented in the form of taped conversations between Gandy, Majeed, Cauthorn, and 
others detailing the operations of the conspiracy.  Id. at 199.  During these conversations, 
the men communicated in code or gestures, further demonstrating Gandy’s familiarity 
with the conspiracy and the mutual trust among the men.  According to Cauthorn, Gandy 
was included in the conversations because, as part of the “inner circle,” “he basically was 
with us, so he had to be aware of the situation . . . .”  (S.A. 171, 175-76.)    
 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude 
that there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Gandy was not a 
one-time buyer, but rather a participant in the charged conspiracy to distribute cocaine.   
III. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
